![]() ![]() ![]() In closing, we propose that the conventions strategy for resolving indeterminacy is widespread and even pervasive in the law. We offer salient illustrations, relying especially on the law of torts, showing how the law substitutes rough-hewn proxies for impenetrable foreseeability questions. We describe two types of conventions: storytelling or narrative conventions, on the one hand, and per se conventions, on the other. ![]() Foreseeability conventions work because they give the concept meaning in particular fields and in discrete situations, furthering the law's basic goals in especially thorny categories of recurring cases. Foreseeability has survived andjlourished, the Article proposes, not because it carries determinate meaning (it does not), but because lawyers, judges, andjuries have establishedfixes or backs-which in this Article we callforeseeability conventions-to settle what would otherwise be intractable foreseeability problems. This Article explains the conundrum offoreseeability's puzzling persistence by offering a novel account of how foreseeability has flourished in fields like tort, contract, and crime. It all depends on how one tells the story. Decisionmakers, observe the critics, can characterize virtually any consequence as either foreseeable or unforeseeable. ![]() critics have pilloried the standard as hopelessly indeterminate. How has the foreseeability standard survived its critics? Law relies on foreseeability to solve hard legal problems in a vast array of doctrinalfields. ![]()
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